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Managing the diverse aspects of a Naval Air Rework
Facility is a complex and demanding task. This report
provides fresh input into two of the areas that are of
concern to NARF management on a daily basis.
First is the management of cost data to provide meaning-
ful information for managers at all levels of the
organization. Included is a brief explanation of the
economic rationalization that supports the Life Cycle Cost
concept. A discussion of the types of financial information
needed by managers and deficiencies in the NIF accounting
system follows .
The next section centers on the basis behind the
Reliability Centered Maintenance concept and how the
deficiencies in the information collection system at NARF
Alameda fail to support the demands of this concept.




II. COST INFORMATION FOR MANAGEMENT 11
III. S-3 OPERATIONAL SERVICE PERIOD LENGTH
CONSIDERATIONS 32
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 49
A. COST INFORMATION 49
B. S-3 OSP LENGTH CONSIDERATIONS 50
LIST OF REFERENCES 53
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 54
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Life Cycle Cost as a Function of SDLM
Frequency 14
2. Life Cycle Cost as a Function of SDLM
Package Cost 17
3. OSP Logic DIAGRAM 41
LIST OF ACRONYMS
CFA Cognizant Field Activity
DMDS Depot Maintenance Data System
DOD Department of Defense
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FRSC Fleet Readiness Support Conference
JON Job Order Number
LCC Life Cycle Cost
NALC Naval Aviation Logistic Center
NAMP Naval Aviation Maintenance Program
NARF Naval Air Rework Facility
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command
NIF Naval Industrial Fund
OSP Operational Service Period
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
SDLM Standard Depot Level Maintenance
SSI Structurally Significant Item
I. INTRODUCTION
Within a socio-economic environment characterized by
public demand for efficiency and economy in government,
tight management of dollar and material resources has become
absolutely necessary for Department of Defense activities.
As DOD managers at all levels have faced shrinking budgets
and level or increasing workloads, austerity measures and
belt tightening exercises have been required. Because of
these trends, managers have been forced to examine closely
every facet of their organizations which competes for a part
of the monetary resource in an effort to eliminate
inefficiencies and ensure that finite dollars are expended
exactly where most needed.
As the Cognizant Field Activity and Designated Overhaul
Point for the S-3 aircraft and related equipment, NARF
Alameda has been subjected to such budget tightening
measures in recent years. These measures have been imposed
by other command echelons in spite of upward trending rework
costs and unanticipated failure/degradation modes discovered
on inducted aircraft. Increasing workloads have not been
met with commensurate increases in resources. In addition
to simple budget reductions, the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) has recently considered a lengthened operating
service period (OSP) for the S-3. The consensus among NARF
managers is almost unanimously against a longer OSP. The
belief being that the goals of fleet S-3 readiness and
safety would not be served by such a measure. A NARF
attempt to propose a reduction in OSP length, however, was
only a qualified success: The proposal failed to achieve a
shorter OSP, although it did postpone the length increase
being contemplated.
NARF Alameda managers perceive a need for changes in
NARF operations and functions that will improve internal
management efforts and better enable the NARF to respond to
external pressures for changes to rework programs and budget
reduction. Specifically, the needs for change appear mainly
around four areas:
1. Improved management cost information and use.
2. Full integration and use of Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) techniques.
3. Improved methods for gathering, interpreting and
managing aircraft failure data.
4. Development of improved management perspectives
regarding S-3 rework program costs and OSP issues.
These areas are the center of focus for this report and form
its objectives, which are:
1. Provide management perspective through a brief review
of the program Life Cycle Cost (LCC) concept and how
NARF rework costs impact LCC.
2. Determine which specific cost information types seem
most useful for internal management, and show how this
information might be gathered at least cost to NARF.
3. Review the evolution of RCM techniques in order to
demonstrate their importance to rework package
content. Apply RCM logic to the OSP issues presented
by NARF so as to provide insight about the
constitution of a defensible OSP proposal.
4. Provide action priorities for NARF managers in order
to enable a systematic approach to the large and
relatively unstructured problems of improving the
management information system.
Chapter II addresses cost areas, Chapter III OSP issues
and RCM techniques. Chapter IV presents conclusions and
specific recommendations for action.
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II. COST INFORMATION FOR MANAGEMENT
Managers of the NARF rework effort must meet schedule
deadlines while operating within budget limits and ensuring
that standards of quality, safety and readiness are not
compromised. With these objectives in mind, they routinely
make strategic and global tradeoff decisions so that goals
are accomplished while constraints are observed. This
chapter addresses ideas concerning the impacts of rework
costs upon the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of an aircraft program,
and the relevant cost information needs of the managers wiio
make cost tradeoff decisions.
The costs that are associated with the Standard Depot
Level iMaintenance (SDLM) of a major weapon system such as
the S-3 are one subset of ail the costs that make up the
total LCC of that weapon system. Some otner cost areas
which contribute to LCC are manpower and training cost,
operations and maintenance cost, configuration upcate cost
and retirement cost. The latest N a v y Program Manager's
Guide states that program managers must consider ?l . . . life
cycle cost such that affordability is put en an equal basis
with system performance, schedule and logistics
supportability." [ R e f . i: pp. 1-5] In recent years,
increased emphasis and effort have been devoted tc the
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understanding and management of the LCC of major weapon
systems, and with good reason. Experience with past
projects demonstrates that concentration only upon the
management of dollar totals within each subset of the LCC of
a major system without regard to the functional relationship
that exists between these cost areas is a serious and often
expensive error.
As an example, impact on operations and maintenance
costs of a decision, made early in the procurement process,
to minimize design and production costs by eliminating fleet
maintainability enhancement features such as access doors.
Such a decision saves money in the design and production
stages, but this savings is wholly offset, depending on the
planned life of the system, by the additional operation and
maintenance costs incurred because such maintainability
enhancement features are not present. This scenario serves
to illustrate some important points. First, managers must
take a "macro" view and concern themselves with the total
LCC of a weapon system in order to get the most "bang for
the buck." This does not, however, imply paying less
attention to the management of all of the component costs
which make up the LCC. Indeed, the management of these
subset costs is just the vehicle through which LCC is
managed. Also, control of LCC depends not only upon the
algebraic sura of all subset costs— it depends as well upon
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the relationships between these subsets and how each affects
others. Understanding these functional relationships
between cost subsets is as important to LCC management as is
cost control within subsets.
S-3 rework costs comprise a significant component of the
operation and maintenance costs for this weapon system and
therefore have a definite impact upon the S-3 LCC.
Management of these costs is crucial as a result. To gain
insight about this management effort, an overview of
aggregate SDLM costs as they seem to relate to LCC is
presented. An examination of relevant cost information
types follows.
Some important functional relationships seem to exist
between the S-3 program's LCC and various aspects of the
SDLM process at NARF Alameda. First, with all other factors
constant, one would expect S-3 LCC to vary as a dependent
variable with Operational Service Period (OSP) length in a
manner similar to that depicted in Figure 1. [NOTE: The
axes for this and following figures are ungraduated since
the primary concern here is the relationship.] The
reasoning underlying this relationship is fairly
straightforward. In Figure 1, SDLM frequency (the
independent variable), is based upon the length of the OSP
between scheduled rework points. In other words, the number

























Note: Point B represents the point where
SDLM frequency is at its optimum.
A SDLM FREQUENCY
(Long OSP) (Short OSP)
Figure 1. Life Cycle Cost as a Function of
SDLM Frequency
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between SDLM points are shortened. Keep in mind that the
LCC in Figure 1 includes intangibles such as the cost of
unchecked aircraft deterioration, the cost of lower
operational readiness, the cost of decreased safety margins,
and so on. Indeed, these intangibles cause the
characteristic shape of the curve. At point A in Figure 1
there are no SDLM's and the OSP length is equal to the life
of the airplane. In this situation, LCC is high even though
SDLM costs are zero, because the intangible costs associated
with decreased safety and readiness increase. Additionally,
fleet organizational and intermediate maintenance costs
increase as the condition of aircraft deteriorates over
time, and fleet organizations (0 and I levels) take on
responsibility for performing the industrial maintenance
tasks that NARF's would have performed (total repaint, in-
depth structural repaair, fabrication, etc.). As one moves
from point A towards point B, along the horizontal axis,
SDLM frequency increases as OSP length is shortened, and LCC
falls towards a minimum at point B. This minimum represents
the point at which the optimum number of SDLM cycles occurs:
Any fewer and the savings in SDLM costs are more than offset
by the rise in tangible and intangible costs just discussed;
any more SDLM cycles and savings in t angi b 1 e / in
t
ang i b 1
e
costs are more than offset by the rise in SDLM cost.
Proposals for a longer OSP rest upon the assumption that the
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aircraft is presently at some point past B on the horizontal
axis of Figure 1, and that lower overall costs would result
in reducing the number of SDLM cycles (e.g., moving leftward
towards B).
A second functional relationship, in which overall S-3
LCC varies dependently with the cost of performing an
average SDLM package, can be contemplated when the number of
SDLM cycles is held constant, every 72 months for the life
of the airplane, for example. A graphic approximation of
this function is shown in Figure 2. This simply shows that
LCC is expected to increase as the cost of performing SDLM
work packages on the aircraft increases. Some important
implications underly this seemingly simple relationship.
First, if the overall goal for the S-3 program is to provide
a set level of effectiveness, measured in terms of fleet
readiness, safety and so on, at the lowest possible LCC,
then proposals for a longer OSP from higher command echelons
make sense. This assumption of an effectiveness goal for
the S-3 is based upon the economists definition of
efficiency. Hitch and McKean put it this way: "The use of
resources is efficient . . . with a single valuable output
or objective (S-3 readiness and safety in this case), where
it is impossible to increase the output without increasing
the use of . . . one of the most valuable inputs (S-3 budget















If average SDLM Package Costs
vary, the LCC of the S-3 is
directly affected.
COST OF AVERAGE SDLM PACKAGE
Figure 2. Life Cycle Cost as a Function of SDLM
Package Cost
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effectiveness goals are being met, then any possibility of
cost savings becomes extremely attractive and the search for
them likely will continue. Figure 2 also implies that
managers should know the general characteristics of SDLM
costs, specifically which cost areas may contain slack, and
which must be vigorously defended because they are
absolutely vital. For example, indirect labor cost
allocations are probably less critical than direct material
costs .
A more subtle characteristic shown in Figure 2 is that
the relationship between LCC and SDLM work package cost is
not necessarily linear. In fact, because the function
relating these two variables is probably very complex and
almost certainly not linear, three curves are shown.
Nonlinearity means that a change in SDLM work package cost
may increase LCC at an increasing, constant, or decrasing
rate. An example of such an impact would be a situation in
which a particular component's inspection, removal and
replacement maintenance actions have been determined to be
required only at six year intervals. If these maintenance
actions are removed from organizational requirements and
placed in a SDLM work package, the cost of the affected work
package increases by just the amount that it costs to do
these added maintenance actions. This added SDLM cost could
be more than offset by savings realized when fleet
18
organizational units are no longer required to train for
this maintenance task or carry the special tools and
fixtures required to perform it. While this example is
contrived, the relationship it demonstrates between the cost
of performing maintenance as part of a SDLM work package or
performing it at some lower level is one that NARF managers
must heed. Other cost relationships exist, but the intent
here has been to direct them along these lines rather than
list all possible variations on the theme.
Other areas of investigation are appropriate at this
point, as they regard SDLM cost. The first concerns the
types and characteristics of cost information most useful to
management. Second is an analysis of the cost information
system presently in operation at NARF Alameda with
particular attention paid to the information that it does
not provide. Third are recommendations for filling
information gaps.
When examining the cost information needs of NARF
managers, one should distinguish between cost "data," as
expressed by raw numbers, and cost information. Information
is data that has been processed/scrubbed and, in this sense,
is that which contributes to a manager's knowledge, allowing
the exercise of judgement in order to draw conclusions and
formulate plans of action. Information, as opposed to data,
allows the exercise of management control, which Mautz and
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Win j urn [Ref. 3: pp. 12-14] define this way: "The
accountant's concept of accounting control is specific as to
source, historically traceable in official documents, and
reasonably clear as to scope." The concept of control held
by executives is none of these.
management control integrates with other management
responsibilities and with management goals and
purposes .
- management control is a broad concept including both
positive goal directed activities and error and
irregularity measures. It subsumes internal accounting
control .
- management control is personnel oriented, directed at
facilitating their success in attaining company goals
within company policy.
Mautz and Winjum further assert that "Management control
actions are positively directed toward the achievement of
company goals as well as precautions and defensive measures
. .
.." [Ibid.: p. 15] Within the context of this report
the terra "cost information" refers to that processed data
which would enable a NARF manager to exercise management
control as defined by Mautz and Winjum. The information is




Monitor achievement of those goals.
- Focus on problems or other areas which warrant
attention .
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- Respond to changes in environment or circumstance while
maintaining perspective with respect to goals and
progress toward their achievement.
What characteristics should cost information possess in
order to truly facilitate the exercise of management
control? The first and probably most obvious is timeliness.
Information needed to make a decision is useless if it is
received after the decision is made, although it still can
be useful in the analysis of trends. The requirement for
timeliness must usually be met before other characteristics
of information become important. Once timeliness is
achieved, however, management will need information that is
concise, accurate at the time it is called. for, and
relevant. Where relevancy is concerned, managers need an
information system that is flexible enough to respond to
their non-standard information requests. One should bear in
mind that not all information needs will have the same
priority, nor will all need to meet the same standard of
accuracy. To ask for information tomorrow when next week
would do, or to demand accuracy to the penny when a rough
estimation would suffice, burdens the information system and
can render it unable to respond to other requests.
With respect to information types, the generic areas
which seem most useful are trend information and information
of special interest, aberrations, or situations which
exhibit abnormal cost behavior. Rather than presume to tell
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managers exactly what should be looked at, the intent here
is to point to areas that might be useful and to point out
what those uses might be. Research for this report included
a study indicating that rework costs for S-3's over the last
one and one-half years showed a fairly steady increase. In
it, the cost data were aggregated. That is, it included all
costs that were required to produce a "reworked S-3," such
as direct and indirect labor, materials, and so on. This is
an example of trend information. The study is nonspecific,
in that it uses many sources of cost data to present an
overall picture. The overall picture is important in
providing insight and calling management attention to
possible problem areas, and can be extremely useful when
managers want to evaluate organizational performance in
terms of goal achievement. Such a broad view is not as
effective as an indicator for the root causes of problem
areas. The above study does not show, for instance, whether
or not indirect material costs played a significant role in
the escalation of overall costs of S-3 rework.
In addition to trend information about overall cost
performance, management needs specific cost element trend
information. Too much information can be worse than too
little, especially when its collection requires inordinate
amounts of time and effort. What must be decided upon is
just which specific cost elements need monitoring. A system
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to gather required information about these cost elements,
which consumes the least possible amount of organizational
energy, can then be designed and implemented.
The other important information type deals with special,
abnormal and generally non-recurring situations. Just as
specific trend information about an individual cost element
complements the overall trend or picture, so does
information about special situations and abnormal cost
behaviors complement both types of trends to form a
comprehensive information picture upon which management
judgement can be exercised. Again there is the danger of
gathering too much information, with the attendant risk of
attempting to "micro-manage" every cost "spike" that occurs.
An adaptation of a quality sampling technique could be used
to safeguard against this tendency. For example, a range
could be established around the average direct labor cost
for the last fifteen S-3's to be reworked, and only those
future aircraft whose direct labor costs fell outside of
this range would be brought to management attention as
candidates for further investigation.
At present, the types of information just discussed are
not provided to NARF managers on an established basis.
Indeed, the lack of an established source for this
information is largely the reason for commissioning the
study noted above. The cost accounting system from which
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the data for that study came is the same system required for
the management of the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) at NARF
Alameda. An examination of this accounting system, with
respect to the information it can and cannot provide, is now
appropriate, and will suggest recommendations for improved
cost information gathering methods.
Watts and Henderson [Ref. 4:p. 8] state that Congress,
through Public Law 216 and the National Security Act as
amended :
".
. . Authorized the Secretary of Defense to require the
establishment of working capital funds in the Department
of Defense for the purpose of providing working capital
for such industrial type, and for such commercial type
activities as provide common services within or among the
departments and agencies of the Department of Defense, as
he may designate, in order to control and account for the
cost of programs and work performed."
This was the legal foundation for the establishment of Naval
Industrial Fund activities. As Watts and Henderson further
show, "Congress intended, by establishing . . . (these)
. . . funds, to ensure that the proven business techniques
of financial cost accounting and expenditure controls for
work performed should be applied at the working levels that
performed work or services comparable to certain civilian
enterprises." [Ibid.: p. 9] Finally, Watts and Henderson
paraphrase existing regulation to show that [Ibid.:p. 10]:
The purposes of the funds . . . are as follows:
a. To provide more effective means to control costs of
goods and services produced, and a more flexible and
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effective means to finance, budget and account for
such operations.
b. To develop a greater sense of responsibility and value
among customer activities which, within their own
fund limitations, will tend to order only what is
necessary . . , and to create a complete buyer
relationship whereby the customer can criticize cost,
quality of work, and delivery speeds of goods or
services performed.
c. To simplify each industrial funded activity's ability
to fulfill its responbili t ies by separately financing
its operations ....
d. To achieve per f o
r
mance- t y pe budget and accounting
structures wherein costs are related to specific
functions or programs and their end uses.
e. To enable cross-servicing among military departments
because of the financial similarities and advantages
cited above.
How are these objectives achieved through the NIF
accounting system at NARF Alameda? First, the funding that
NARF receives with which to carry on its aeronautical rework
program is based upon a negotiation process with the Naval
Aviation Logistics Center (NALC). These negotiations take
place yearly, and quarterly for update, during what are
known as Fleet Readiness Support Conferences (FRSC). In
preparation for such a conference, NARF staff personnel
obtain anticipated workload data based upon depot mainte-
nance/service requirements, aircraft issue requirements,
flying hour program requirements for engine and component
rework, and utilization to determine rework needs for ground
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support equipment and other supporting programs. Using this
anticipated workload, staff personnel formulate workload
standards for aircraft, engines and components. Then, using
these standards, charge rates are derived for direct labor,
indirect labor, material and overhead that would enable the
NARF to just break even. This break-even philosophy is
intended to ensure that the industrial fund, composed of
NARF cash and assets, neither expands because of overcharges
to customers nor shrinks because of undercharges. These
norms and standards are negotiated at the FRSC and adjusted
as necessary, and then are used by the NALC to fund the
NARF, which charges customers at those rates until they are
renegotiated .
The process of charging these rates to customer
activities constitutes the portion of the NIF accounting
procedure designed to ". . . induce (those) customer
activities to order only what is necessary," as addressed by
Watts and Henderson. It is based upon the concept of
directly associating costs for labor, material and other
services to end products and overhead functions, and is
described in detail in the Naval Air Re w or kFac i 1 i t y Cost
Control Manual, [Ref. 5: N A V
A
VNLOGCEN I NST 03.1/AS.1P WPC-
13403]. Briefly, direct associaton of cost to end items is
accomplished by means of Job Order Number (JON). According
to the NARF Cost Control Manual [Ref. 6: p. 1-2-1]: "Cost
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accumulation is accomplished through job orders coded to
basic source documents covering labor, material and other
costs." These job orders include basic information
concerning the type of work and the identity of the customer
authorizing the work. Cost data is accumulated and posted
to the job order by multiplying man-hour and material usage
data from a shop transactor system by the appropriate labor
and material rates. An "acceleration rate" is applied to
direct labor figures and others to arrive at the appropriate
overhead charges. This description of the operation of the
existing accounting system, although brief, will serve as a
basis for examination of the information that the system
provides as well as those areas where it falls short.
The NIF accounting system at NARF Alameda is effective
in that it does precisely what it is designed to do. That
is, it ties funding levels for the NARF directly to
projected workload, it accumulates costs and associates them
with specific end items, and it provides a vehicle for
charging customer activities for work performed. These
functions serve to make customers value-conscious and ensure
that the NIF neither grows or shrinks. The system is
generally geared to provide the information that is
necessary to service external relationships between NARF and
funding activities and between NARF and customer activities.
Discussions concerning management information needs that
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appeared earlier in this report centered primarily around
the information required for internal management, and in
this area the NIF accounting system is weak for a number of
reasons
.
The most important issue is timeliness. As shown above,
the NIF accounting system is designed to respond to
information needs that occur on a quarterly or yearly cycle.
That is, the system provides budget variance data. A budget
variance would occur when the standard rates charged for
labor, materials, and overhead are either too low or too
high, resulting in NIF shrinkage or growth. In order to
ensure that costs are associated with end items, JON's for
aircraft often must remain active three to five months after
rework on the aircraft has been completed. This necessary
characteristic of the NIF system results in its inability to
meet, on a regular basis, the need for timely internal
management information. The system is not designed to
provide routine and timely bi-weekly or monthly trend and
special information to middle managers about costs.
Another issue is accuracy. Research indicates that some
error is introduced into information provided by the NIF
system because work completions cannot always be transacted
immediately. The cause of this problem can be traced almost
directly to the high level of personnel turnover within the
workcenters. As a consequence, workcenter supervisors must
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make transactions as time permits. Managers who intend to
use this information, then, must realize that it may be
somewhat distorted. The following discussions concern
information provided by the Depot Maintenance Data System
(DMDS) and how it meets information needs not met by the NIF
system. It is important to remember that DMDS depends upon
the same net of transactors used by the NIF system as a
primary data source, and is therefore subject to the same
distortion. If managers remain aware of this fact, DMDS can
be a powerful management tool.
The DMD System is designed to collect and incorporate
depot repair, replacement and consumption data into the 3-M
and NALC data bases. It responds to a recognized need for
depot data as well as intermediate and organizational level
data when making decisions concerning stock levels,
purchases of spares and provisioning for new program starts.
In this sense, the DMDS fulfills a vital role and should be
fully integrated at NARF Alameda. More important to the
purpose of this report, however, are the management reports
generated by the DMD System. As stated, the most
immediately useful cost information for NARF managers is
trend and special information. The ability of DMDS to
provide precisely these types of information will be
discussed next. Rather than list every report available
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from the system, the following discussions select a few and
present ideas about their use.
The first DMDS report that provides important management
information is the SDLM AIRCRAFT SUMMARY DATA REPORT. It
shows, by Aircraft Bureau Number, induction dates,
completion dates, number of working days and number of man-
hours. The format of the report is excellent and will
easily accommodate analysis of general and specific trends
on any or all of the above areas of concern.
Another report that is ideally suited to management
needs is the NARF JOB ORDER NUMBER REPORT. It provides
direct civilian labor cost, direct material cost, indirect
general and administrative cost, and indirect production
cost information by job order number and by aircraft bureau
number. This report facilitates the analysis of specific
trends and will provide some specific or special
information .
The UNSCHEDULED REPAIR ACTIONS REPORT shows, by bureau
number, the five aircraft requiring the largest number of
unscheduleld maintenance actions. This report would
facilitate the examination of special situations such as the
occurrence of stabilizer attach fitting cracks on inducted
aircraft. A closely related report, that shows the man-
hours expended on unscheduled maintenance actions, would
30
prove extremely useful in the preparation of a well
documented budget argument.
The DMD System provides other reports that present
information in many areas, but this brief discussion is
sufficient to make the point that DMDS is superior to the
NIF system in providing management information. DMDS, in
short, is the best means of providing required management
information at least cost in terms of organizational
resources. Much of the groundwork for its implementation
has already been done at NARF Alameda. The transactors are
in place. The software has been written and debugged. The
system's use is mandated by higher authority. All that is
required is management support, and such support would yield
great dividends.
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III. S-3 OPERATIONAL SERVICE PERIOD LENGTH CONSIDERATIONS
As a significant contributor to Life Cycle Cost, SDLM
has been the object of close scrutiny within the S-3
program. Attention from external sources has forced a close
look at rework costs and the devotion of intensified effort
toward their management. Information that facilitates the
intensification of cost management effort was the thrust of
the previous chapter. The object of this chapter is to
present a straightforward look at OSP issues by first
reviewing the changes that have occurred in maintenance
concepts since 1970, and then examining the evolution of the
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCiM) Program. Finally,
brief applications of RCM logic are related to S-3 OSP
issues in an effort to provide management insight for these
concerns .
Naval aviation maintenance philosophy has changed
significantly over the life of S-3 aircraft. All are
familiar with the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP)
as delineated in OPNAV Instruction 4790.2 (series), where
the three level maintenance concept is defined. This
familiarity may lead into a subtle trap, however. The idea
of dividing the life of an airplane up into operating
segments that are separated by maintenance segments during
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which total aircraft rework is performed, is a comfortable
one. Completely rebuilding or reworking an airframe
periodically makes intuitive sense. The subtle trap
mentioned lies precisely in this confidence. Research
indicates that some managers have been lulled into a
willingness to defend what it seems the OSP ought to be,
rather than embrace new and possibly better ideas. A recent
unsupported proposal to shorten the S-3 OSP was turned down
by NALC where a documented proposal that embraced current
thought and procedure might not have been. Specifically,
the NALC response stated, in part, that [Ref. 8:p. 11]
"Specific information, supported by RCM analysis, is
considered essential to ensure that the (proposed) OSP is
technically valid and could sustain a rational challenge."
This point is crucial. Other echelons of command require
that OSP proposals possess the attributes of technical
validity and rational soundness. The officially recognized
source for these attributes is the analysis/logic framework
within the RCM program. Proposals can no longer be based
upon what seems right, and preconceived ideas about SDLM
frequency, depth and breadth must be dropped. This does not
mean that common sense cannot be exercised, but no longer
can appeals with little or no technical substance be
expected to decide OSP length issues that involve such high
monetary stakes. Both RCM analysis and the formalized
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collection of data to facilitate that analysis must become
integral to the rework process at NARF Alameda.
What evolutionary changes in maintenance philosophy led
to RCM? The following background is found in the RCM
Handbook [Ref. 8:p. iii]:
"Early approaches to preventive maintenance programs
were based on the concept that periodic overhaul ensures
reliability and therefore operating safety. Tests by the
airlines in 1965 showed that scheduled overhaul of complex
equipment has little or no effect on the reliability of
the equipment in service. These tests identified the need
for a new concept for preventive maintenance, which was
eventually developed in 1968."
Preventive maintenance programs that did not assume a
relationship between periodic rework, reliability and
safety were named Reliability Centered Maintenance programs,
and were first implemented by the airlines in 1970. The
first applications of these techniques by the U.S. Navy were
made in 1972 in the S-3A, P-3A, and F-4J programs. Dropping
the assumption that reliability and safety depend upon
rework is not all that identifies RCM programs, however.
Even broader in focus, they are intended to ". . . provide
the organizational focus and systematic procedures to (1)
analyze the maintenance requirements for . . . aircraft,
(2) objectively justify every maintenance requirement, and
(3) enforce the performance of only the justified
maintenance actions." [Ref. 9: p. 11] RCM implementation
is mandated in Defense Guidance through the Chief of Naval
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Operations. Further background is provided in a study
performed by the Center for Naval Analyses which is appended
to this report. [Ref. 10]
While early applications of RCM techniques to the S-3
program seem to have resulted in an airplane that exhibits
unanticipated failure modes, follow-on applications of the
techniques are through the Age Exploration Program (closely
related to RCM), are designed to accommodate these
unanticipated failures. These follow-on applications depend
upon the formal accumulation and examination of failure data
resulting from S-3 operations and will not necessarily allow
one to assume that those failures need to be corrected at
the depot level.
Ah examination of the RCM program simply reveals logical
formalizations of the thought processes that have always
been used when deciding upon what and how much maintenance
to do. The application of logic leaves no room for
unsupported claims, however, and RCM is very different from
old methods in that sense. The RCM analysis process
consists of three higher order questions and a series of
lower order questions incorporated into a logic tree that
determines the type of maintenance task to be performed and
the maintenance level at which it is to be performed. These
determinations are made for both preventive and corrective
maintenance actions. The higher order questions determine
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the consequence of failure and the objective of the
maintenance task based upon that consequence. In a
situation where the consequence of failure is loss of an
aircraft, for example, the objective of the RCM maintenance
task is to prevent any failures from occurring. The lower
order questions then translate the objective into a specific
type of maintenance task that will accomplish the objective
at least cost. With these essentials of the RCM system in
mind, one can move to a brief look at the S-3 OS? length
history, so as to set the stage for the examination of the
OSP issues that formed the basis for NARF concern.
In 1973, after completion of initial contractor
maintenance engineering analyses, the length of the S-3
operating service period was set at twenty-four months. OSP
length was increased to forty-eight months (with a flight
hour limit of 2200 hours) in 1975 after a joint Analytical
Maintenance Program (AMP) study was completed by NARF
Ala ra e da /Lockhee d. This study recognized the excellent
material condition exhibited by airplanes that had been
inducted after completing their initial twenty-four months
of service. OSP length was increased again in 1980 to
seventy-two months at the recommendation of NARF Alameda,
after it was realized that fatigue life expenditure was less
than expected. OSP length is presently at the seventy -two
month level. Since 1980, Naval Air Systems Command has
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considered increasing OSP length to ninety-six months, but
has not yet decided to do so. Also since 1980, the Aircraft
Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) program has been
implemented, making OSP extensions for operating aircraft
highly probable. This means that it is likely for some S-3
aircraft to go eighty-four months (one operating period of
seventy-two months plus one twelve month extension) or more
before induction. For these reasons and because of mounting
concern over deteriorating aircraft material condition and
new modes of material failure, NARF proposed shortening S-3
OSP length to forty-eight months in 1984. This proposal was
refused for reasons discussed in following sections.
Official guidelines for the determination of OSP length
are set forth in Appendix C of MIL-STD-21 73( AS). In brief,
this standard requires that OSP length be determined by
establishing preventive maintenance requirements and
intervals that prevent unacceptable aircraft degradation,
and then determining which maintenance levels must perform
those requirements. Those depot level requirements which
have safety impacts are considered to be the primary factors
affecting OSP, and they are grouped together so as to be
performed at the end of specified operating intervals. Two
other key concepts presented by the appendix are [Ref. 9:
App. C, pp. 148-149]:
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- The OSP is determined solely by justifiable scheduled
depot maintenance requirements.
- The OSP analysis should not . . . reflect any
preconception that aircraft must visit a depot facility
on a scheduled basis, or that all scheduled depot
maintenance must be done concurrently. The analysis to
determine optimum OSP . . . must substantiate that
required material condition will be achieved at least
cost
.
The logic tree presented in Figure 3 is taken from Appendix
C of MIL-STD-2173(AS) , and embodies the questions which must
be asked of any maintenance task under consideration as an
OSP determinant. It assumes that the task has already been
evaluated through RCiM analysis. This assumption holds true
for both this report and the NARF proposal to shorten the S-
3 OSP, the NARF OSP.
The four areas of concern contained in the NARF request
are :
(A) Unanticipated degradation and failure of flight
control hardware (bearings, rod ends, fairleads,
etc . ) .
(B) Cracks in n o n s t r u c t u r a 1 1 y significant airframe
components including sonobuoy deck, keelson longeron
fitting and horizontal stabilizer attach fittings.
(C) Significantly increased corrosion degradation and
paint/sealant system failure since late 1982.
(D) Requirement for depot replacement of canopy jettison
pyrotechnic material at forty-eight month intervals.
Beginning with the flight control hardware failure
issue, one must first determine (according to the question
one in Figure 3), whether the flight control hardware
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inspection/replacement task is an OSP candidate task. In
order to be so classified, this task must either, (a) be
associated with structural elements whose failures would
result in a direct adverse effect on operating safety, or
(b) result in significant economic consequences if not
accomplished. The task does not meet the first condition,
since a NARF Alameda letter of 1984 states that "The
structurally significant item (SSI) inspections at SDLM have
not indicated any major problem areas." [Ref. 1 1 : p . 1]
The question of significant economic consequences is not so
easily answered, however. Such consequences probably exist,
but so little has formally been done to document them that
making a case will be extremely difficult. The first and
most basic step is to consolidate every bit of data that
exists on these failures into a data base upon which
analysis can be performed. In order to justify the failures
as OSP determinants, examination of this data will likely
have to take the form of a Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA). This analysis would determine the types of
failure being experienced and the operational effects (in
terms of readiness), of each type of failure. Once failure
effects are organized in this fashion, meaningful economic
cos t- t
r
adeo f f analysis is possible, contrasting cost of
downtime due to failures with the cost of shortening the
OSP (thereby increasing SDLM costs).
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It seems that the second, third and fourth questions
from Figure 3 concerning task performance, effectiveness and
the need for depot skills and equipment, can be grouped
together. In response to the second question, task
effectiveness should be fairly easily shown once the
operational (and attendant economic) consequences had been
catalogued in response to the first question. In other
words, the effectiveness of replacing worn hardware seems
apparent, as it would eliminate the operational, and
therefore the economic, consequence. The real question is
whether depot skills and equipment are required to perform
the task. In order to answer, one must look at the repair
actions required to correct failure modes discovered in the
FMEA. Unless the bulk of the maintenance tasks required
depot skills and/or equipment, this question will result in
rejection of the task as an OSP determinant, as Figure 3
shows. Suppose, for instance, that most of the maintenance
involved in the task can be performed by squadron and
intermediate maintenance personnel with only a limited
requirement for depot work. Question five of Figure 3 then
implies that aircraft modification would be considered
before the task would be accepted as an OSP determinant. An
example of this situation would be the assembly and
distribution of "0" and "I" level airframes changes (AFC)
kits for incorporation by fleet personnel. Any depot
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portions of the task would be performed on a scheduled basis
by NARF field teams or as depot AFC's at SDLM. The
practical upshot is that this task is very difficult to
defend as an OSP determinant.
The second area of NARF concern involves cracks in
various airframe components. As noted earlier, none of the
components involved have yet been identified as SSI's. This
makes defending an inspection/correction task as an OSP
determinant nearly impossible on any grounds other than
significant economic consequence. This is the reason that a
review of the SSI List to determine whether any components
affected by the cracks should be added is recommended in the
following chapter. This review should be conducted in
addition to a thorough FMEA. If none of the affected items
can legitimately be added to the list, then defense of the
inspect/correct tasks as OSP determinants becomes as
difficult as the flight control hardware case, since both
depend on making a sound case for significant economic
consequence. Again, this case will rest upon the conduct of
cost tradeoff analyses after requisite data has been
collected and FMEA has been completed.
The third issue in the NARF OSP proposal concerned
increased corrosion degradation and paint/sealant-systera
failure since late 1982. Once again the first question from
Figure 3 requires showing that significant economic
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consequences will result if the inspection/treat rnent/repaint
task is not performed, since no safety structural components
are involved. Showing that these consequences exist is
difficult for two reasons. First, pain t / sea Ian t -s y s te ra
failure will have to be precisely defined. Hard standards
must be formulated since the object will be to demonstrate
the economy of performing corrosion treatment/repaint at the
depot level every forty-eight months vice every seventy-two.
This cost tradeoff analysis will depend on the percentage
of aircraft which fail an inspection, and will not stand on
a hazy or ill-defined standard. Second, the question of
depot skill and equipment requirements presents a formidable
difficulty in defending the task as an OSP determinant.
Total repaint of an aircraft is a depot maintenance task,
and essentially all other corrosion work within the Navy is
defined as organizational level maintenance. Answering
"yes" to the depot facilities and skills question then
requires that aircraft which fail to pass the inspection
standard need either total repaint or some other corrosion
maintenance that fleet technicians cannot perform (such as
treatment of major intergranular corrosion on an SSI).
Anything less and the task cannot be justified as an OSP
determinant. Probably a more viable alternative than
defending this as an OSP task would be to propose
intensified "0" level corrosion requirements through manual
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changes (including maintenance frequency and depth), and to
institute a more aggressive NARF Field Team effort to
respond to those cases where damage requiring depot skills
and facilities does exist. NARF funding constraints are
obviously important here.
The final OSP issue brought to light in the NARF
proposal is the requirement for depot removal and
replacement of canopy- jettison pyrotechnic material at
forty-eight month intervals. Of all the issues considered,
this one appears to have the most merit. Failure of the
canopy- jettison system due to nonperformance of the
replacement task would certainly impact negatively upon
operational safety. Therefore, the answer to the first
question is yes. The answer to the second question is an
automatic yes, since the task is defined as depot level
maintenance. Analysis can stop at this point since this
definition as a depot level task means that all subsequent
questions can be answered in the affirmative. The task is
by definition a legitimate OSP determinant in the Figure 3
sense. When the S-3 OSP was set at the original twenty-four
month length, the pyrotechnic replacement task was required
during the second SDLM visit and every other visit
thereafter. At the forty-eight month OSP length, the task
was required during every SDLM visit. With the present OSP
length of seventy-two months, however, the task will only
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become due coincident with SDLM at every third SDLM visit,
leaving much work up to Depot Field Team repair. A change
in either the OSP length or the interval at which this task
is required seems economically sound. Since the other tasks
examined here can be defended as OSP determinants only after
extensive analysis has been performed (with the possible
exception of those cases in which cracks can be shown to
involve SSI's— see above), making a case for shortening the
OSP on the basis of the pyrotechnic task alone will be
difficult. Therefore, the recommendation of this report is
that the present situation continue until some of the other
analyses are completed.
The above examinations, though superficial, are intended
for illustration rather than as the basis for OSP
determinations themselves. It is realized that real-world
FMEA and SSI List reviews require engineering talent to
carry out. The intent here is to provide a perspective from
whicli to move into discussions about related areas of
interest concerning the S-3 OSP.
The first and most important point is the resounding
need to centralize the data already gathered about above
failure modes and to formalize methods of gathering this
data. Centralization and formalization as a data base will
enable managers to examine the data, eliminate any noise or
duplication, and get down to the real business of Failure
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Modes and Effects Analyses. Just as important, areas where
data depth and breadth are presently insufficient to support
such analyses will become apparent, and additional data can
be sought.
More needs to be said about gathering critical
information. The first chapter showed that a system for
providing management cost information at NARF Alameda was
needed. While a system for gathering data about significant
aircraft failures does exist, it does not seem geared to
provide data in a format that facilitates the construction
of OSP proposals. Explicit procedures should be adopted
that seek failure data upon aircraft induction. The system
should be formalized and put under the cognizance of a
manager or department that has, as a primary concern, the
collection and interpretation of this data. Focus is
crucial if tight defensible proposals are to be made.
A related area for which managerial focus and emphasis
are absolutely important is the RCM area itself. This
program must be given the highest possible priority since it
is the foundation upon which the NARF maintenance effort
rests. Higher command echelons view RCM analysis as the
major determinant for SDLM content. Organizational
structure should therefore be oriented toward ensuring that
this analysis is made a routine and integral part of
preparing OSP proposals.
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Finally, OSP proposals must possess both technical
validity and the ability to withstand rational challenge in
order to succeed. Technical validity is assured when
thorough data collection and extensive FMEA are completed.
This "technical homework" is precisely the type of work NARF
Alameda, as Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) for the S-3, is
expected to perform. Indeed, as the CFA and recognized
source of expertise for that weapon system, NARF Alameda
should rarely be challenged when it has rendered a technical
judgement based upon its research and engineering. The
second requirement— "the ability to withstand rational
challenge"— is a more difficult one to meet. The ability to
withstand such challenges evidently requires the performance
of global cost-tradeoff analyses which show clearly that S-3
LCC will be significantly reduced by the proposed action.
It does not seem that a NARF is appropriately suited for
such analytical work, nor should OSP proposals be denied
simply because they do not leave NARF with these analyses
attached. If NARF research and expertise show that a
proposal for an OSP change has technical merit, then cost
tradeoff analysis to determine whether the proposal has
economic merit seems a job for other experts. At least, in
such cases, funding should be provided so that NARF can




This completes the examination of OSP issues. The
following chapter serves to consolidate and present
conclusions and recommendations with regard to both this
chapter and the previous one.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents conclusions drawn from this report
and makes recommendations based upon those conclusions. The
first section deals with the cost area and the second takes
up the OSP area. Each section begins with general remarks,
which are followed by itemized suggestions for action.
A. COST INFORMATION
NARF Alameda has a cost data-gathering system in
operation which is designed to meet the data requirements of
the NIF Accounting System, but which fails to provide good
cost management information. Because of its narrow focus,
the system provides data that is neither current,
necessarily relevant nor properly formatted. Special
information needs (e.g., trends or tracing costs to specific
bureau numbers) often require significant hand manipulation,
if indeed the information can be retrieved from the system
at all
.
Managers at various levels need rework cost information
in the forms of general trend, specific trend and special
case information. Such information is required both for
internal cost and rework program management, and for
externally defending budget requests or framing proposals to
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change SDLM frequency, depth or breadth. Recommendations
therefore are that NARF:
- Implement the Depot Maintenance Data System as soon as
possible. This system is mandated by higher authority.
Software programming and system design problems have
been solved. Benefit will be realized immediately,
since many information needs will be met by this system
alone. Successful implementation will depend directly
upon the amount of support the system receives.
Therefore, implementation responsibilities should be
specific .
- Examine the exact nature of the cost information needs
of managers. Inputs should be sought from all relevant
managers. These inputs should be scrubbed and
prioritized to ensure that resources expended to design
and implement any information system provide maximum
benefit. Again, specific managers or departments
should be assigned implementation responsibilities as
appropriate .
- Compare information needs to the information provided
by the N I F Accounting System and the DMD System.
Determine, using contracting if necessary, whether
minor procedural or system changes would meet any
remaining information needs.
- For information needs which can be met by neither the
NIF System nor DMDS, consider contracting for
additional data base management system capability that
would allow various avenues of data access and random
management query. Economic justification for such a
complex and expensive system admittedly depends on the
importance of making the information available to
managers
.
Become more aggressive in the use of cost information
in framing and defending proposals to other echelons of
command. Make SDLM cost impacts, even if they are only
"best estimates," a part of OSP change proposals.
B. S-3 OSP LENGTH CONSIDERATIONS
Fleet activities that are receiving reworked S-3
aircraft from NARF Alameda are satisfied with those
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aircraft. All fleet maintenance officers interviewed for
this report expressed this satisfaction with regards to air-
worthiness, safety and material condition (NOTE: In fact,
the ONLY areas that garnered any negative comment were
specific problems with individual component rework and the
Customer Service program— both minor/isolated and neither of
concern here). NARF Alameda's S-3 rework program is
"getting the job done" in terms of safety and quality.
There is a problem, however, that seems to center around the
apparent degradation of the CFA role for the S-3 aircraft.
NARF Alameda can strengthen its role as CFA through
consistent preparation of unreputably thorough, economically
and technically sound proposals. These proposals should
leave no question about who are the technical and
engineering experts for the S-3 aircraft. This role should
be a source of strength to demonstrate the talent and
expertise employed at NARF Alameda. Recommendations
therefore are that NARF:
Aggressively exercise engineering judgement and make
this judgement known to other echelons of command. As
noted in chapter three, technical judgements rendered
by NARF that are based upon engineering expertise can
hardly be doubted. If the S-3 OSP issues NARF raised
are truly important, then they deserve thorough
technical i
n
ves t i ga t i on
/
doc u men t a t i on and the best
effort possible in supporting them at the next level of
command. These efforts must embrace RCM analysis. A




Embrace the techniques of RCM analysis and Age
Exploration. Full support for these programs is, quite
simply, assumed by higher echelons of command. Lack of
RCM/Age Exploration analysis guarantees failure for OSP
and related proposals. Assign responsibility for the
program to appropriate personnel/departments, under a
separate branch if necessary. Ensure that all reports
of new failure modes, or new data on known modes, is
routed through the RCM branch. Devote whatever
organizational resources are required to these efforts,
since they determine SDLM content in a very real sense.
Consolidate and formalize failure and discrepancy data
that relates to OSP issues and SDLM content. Consider
a data base concept to ensure that both fleet inputs
and inputs that originate from inducted airplanes are
routed promptly to the RCM Analysis Branch for
examination. Ensure that these failure/discrepancy
inputs are catalogued in a formal "repository" which
allows quick recall and ease of manipulation. Such a
system may be manual. The important thing should be
that the system be formalized, and explicit enough to
ensure proper routing and handling of data.
Begin performing explicit Failure Modes and Effects
Analyses on failure/discrepancy data. This effort will
be facilitated by the consolidation and formalization
described above. These analyses must be as rigorous
and technically sound as data limitations allow.
Additional data should be sought, where needed, through
Airframes Bulletins (one-time inspections for the
existence of a condition or failure) and other means as
appropriate. In conjunction with this effort, review
the SSI List for currency in view of new airframe
modes, to determine whether items affected by new
cracks should be added.
Provide other echelons of command with estimated cost
impacts (at least as far as SDLM is concerned) when
proposals are made to change SDLM frequency, breadth
and depth.
Request clarification from NALC about the responsi-
bility for Life Cycle Cost tradeoff analyses required
by RCM procedures. It is not felt that these analyses
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